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ABSTRACT
This article reviews two approaches to the implementation of neutral principles of law –
the constitutionally permissible method of resolving property disputes between bodies in a 
religious hierarchy.  Though both approaches may be valid, the formal title approach, as 
implemented by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex 
Presbyterian Church, leads to problems in application that have been rectified by that court’s 
more recent decision in In re St. James the Less.  It is the contention of this article that future 
courts and practitioners facing church property disputes can draw guidance from the St. James 
decision when faced any church property dispute to be resolved under neutral principles of law.
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Here Is the Church, Now Who Owns the Steeple?
A Revised Approach to Church Property Disputes
By:  Adam E. Lyons1
In November of 2005, in response to the Episcopal church’s position on homosexuality, a 
coalition of church members gathered in Pittsburgh to voice their intent to force a separation 
from the hierarchy.2 Though the dispute was theological, the protest came with an 
acknowledgement that it was likely to spill over into the practical, as dissenting parishes sought 
not only to leave the church’s sacrament but also to take their parish buildings with them.3  The 
protest could hardly have surprised the Episcopal church; it and many of the other mainline 
American churches are embroiled in internal disputes stemming from disagreements on this issue 
and others.4
Pennsylvania’s courts are intimately familiar with such disputes.  Just within the 
Episcopal church, different groups have brought property disputes before the courts in 
Philadelphia5 and Pittsburgh6 over the last few years.  There is every reason to expect that similar 
property disputes will come before the Pennsylvania courts again.
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2 Neela Banerjee, Conservative Episcopalians Warn Church That It Must Change Course or Face Split, N. Y. 
TIMES, A9 (Nov. 12, 2005)
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Lutherans Reject Plan to Allow Gay Clerics, N.Y. TIMES, A7 (Aug. 13, 2005); Neela 
Banerjee, Methodist Divisions Over Gays Intensify, N.Y. TIMES, A16 (OCT. 21, 2005)
5 See In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 953 NP 2001, 2003 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 91 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Mar. 10, 2003) aff’d 833 A.2d 319 aff’d  888 A.2d 795.
6 See Compl. filed in Calvary Episcopal Church v. Duncan, Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 
Pennsylvania, Eq. No. 03-20944, filed Oct. 24, 2003.
2When they do, they will be heard in light of an established conceptual framework.  In 
1978, the Supreme Court of the United States issued Jones v. Wolf7 in which it, for the first time, 
specifically approved the constitutionality of the “neutral principles of law” approach for 
resolving disputes regarding the ownership of church property.  Since that time, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has issued two opinions applying neutral principles, Presbytery of Beaver-
Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church8 in 1985 and In re: St. James the Less9 in 2005.  
Interestingly, while both decisions claim to apply the same neutral principles of law approach to 
similar facts, they come to opposite results, in one case finding in favor of the local parish and in 
the other in favor of the hierarchy.  St. James asserts that this alternate holding is due to those 
few facts that distinguish the earlier decision from the later, but close analysis reveals that 
something else occurs.  Examination of these cases and the precedents from which they stem
shows that Beaver-Butler suffered from inherent failings that St. James rectified.
This article argues that with In re: St. James the Less, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
modified its prior statement on judicial oversight of ecclesiastical organizations.  While the use 
of neutral principles of law to resolve church property disputes remains the rule, the particular 
method by which the court had applied that approach (the “formal title” method) is no longer 
valid.  Instead, courts are specifically instructed to review religious documents as part of their 
neutral principles analysis and are to give such documents an unweighted reading when 
determining whether a property interest exists.
Part one of this article provides an overview of the development of the neutral principles 
of law approach, with a specific focus on those elements that are key to Beaver-Butler and St. 
James.  Part two reviews the Beaver-Butler decision and examines relevant elements of prior 
7
  443 U.S. 595 (1979).
8
  489 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1985).
3decisions, both those it relied on and those it ignored.  Part three discusses St. James in light of 
Beaver-Butler, highlighting some of the tensions in the earlier opinion that are addressed by St. 
James.  In part four, the article examines the guidance that future courts and practitioners facing
church property disputes should draw from St. James.  Finally, the article reviews certain lessons 
to be drawn from the change in Pennsylvania law, both for courts in Pennsylvania and those in 
other jurisdictions.
I. The United States Supreme Court Has Developed Guidelines for Resolving Church 
Property Disputes.
The detailed history of civil court review of church property disputes is well-documented 
elsewhere10 and is far beyond the scope of this article. A brief overview of that history, however, 
is necessary for understanding the context in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued 
Beaver-Butler and St. James.
In Watson v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that in property disputes 
between a parish11 and the hierarchy with which it affiliates, civil courts must defer to and 
enforce the decisions of that hierarchy.12  In no small part, the Court based this ruling on the 
simple logic that civil courts could not be proficient adjudicators of ecclesiastical disputes,13 a 
position which, as the Court noted, was also taken by a number of state supreme courts, 
9 In re: Church of St. James the Less, 888 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005).
10 See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams, Jones v. Wolf:  Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 
128 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1291 (1980); Louis J. Sirico, The Constitutional Dimensions of Church Property Disputes, 59 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 7-48 (1981); Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious 
Organization, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 521-29 (1990).
11
  Denominations make use of differing terms to describe their internal structures.  For ease of reference “parish” 
will be used throughout this article to mean the local church and “hierarchy” will be used to mean any superior body 
having authority over it.
12
  80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871) (“whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law 
have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal 
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.”).
Watson was the first United States Supreme Court decision on this point.  For a review of the prior rule as 
established by the English courts, i.e. the “departure from doctrine” approach, see id. at 727-28.  
13 Id. at 729. (“It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical 
law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”).
4including the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.14  This approach, which has become alternatively 
known as the “deference” or “polity”15 approach, was not limited to a property dispute per se, 
but instead was the only permissible approach for dealing with any ecclesiastical dispute brought 
before a civil court.16 In effect, this rule created a pro-hierarchy bias because every such dispute 
involves a hierarchy that believes it is right.
Subsequent to Watson, federal courts resolved church property disputes pursuant to the 
deference approach, though a few decisions suggested that alternate approaches could be 
permitted.17 Of note among these is Maryland and Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. 
Sharpsburg Church, in which Justice Brennan, in concurrence, stated that “[n]eutral principles of 
law, developed for use in all property disputes, provide another means for resolving litigation 
over religious property. Under the ‘formal title’ doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership 
by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws.”18 This “formal title”
approach would have resolved church property disputes according to the exclusively civil law 
14 We cannot better close this review of the authorities than in the language of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of the German Reformed Church v.
Seibert  [3 Pa. 282 (1846)]: “The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every 
other judicial tribunal, are final, as they are the best judges of what constitutes 
an offence against the word of God and the discipline of the church.  Any other 
than those courts must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline, and 
doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise 
their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would only 
involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do anything
but improve either religion or good morals.” 
Id. at 733 (footnote omitted).
15
  “Polity” references the first step of the analysis – determining that the parish is part of a hierarchical organization 
as opposed to having a congregational governance.  Adams, supra note 10, at 1292 n.5.
16
  80 U.S. at 729.  Watson was not articulated as being a constitutional decision, but later Courts have placed 
Watson squarely within the requirements of the First Amendment.  See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602; see also 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (the 
decision in Watson had “a clear constitutional ring”); Adams, supra note 10, at 1293 n.10.
17 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969) (“And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied 
without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded.”).
18
 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
5documents pertaining to the property in question.   That, however, was not the approach that the 
Court adopted with its 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf. 19
In Jones, the Court faced a property dispute regarding which of two factions in a parish 
had the right to the parish’s property when the smaller faction was loyal to the hierarchy to 
which the parish belonged and the larger faction was not.20  Writing for the five-member
majority, Justice Blackmun first held that, subject to certain constitutional limitations (most 
importantly, the requirement that the civil courts not resolve church property disputes on the 
basis of religious doctrine), 
the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a 
particular method of resolving church property disputes.  Indeed, 
“a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling 
church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of 
doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the 
tenets of faith.”21
The Court further held that one of these permitted approaches was the application of “neutral 
principles of law.”22
The Court reasoned that neutral principles of law “promises to free civil courts 
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”23  To 
resolve these church property disputes, a court will look at deeds, state statutes, and relevant 
“religious documents” (specifically including, in Jones, the “Book of Church Order”) and 
“scrutinize the document[s] in purely secular terms.”24  When examining “religious documents,” 
however, the “civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular 
terms, and not to rely on religious precepts,” especially where the
19
  443 U.S. 595 (1979).
20 Id. at 597.
21 Id. at 602 (quoting 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
22 Id. at 602.
23 Id. at 603.
24 Id. at 601.
6deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general 
church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to 
the ownership of property.  If in such a case the interpretation of 
the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to 
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the 
resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical 
body.25
Thus, the Jones court approved an approach under which religious documents are viewed for 
their civil significance unless they are so instilled with religious meaning as to make civil court 
review impossible.
The Court also addressed the fear that a new rule would change the status quo between 
parishes and hierarchies where both had long understood any property stayed with the hierarchy.  
To alleviate that fear, the Court specifically stated that the parties could remove any doubt about 
the intent to create a trust by placing language stating their intent in the deeds, parish’s charter, 
or hierarchy’s constitution.26  The change from Watson to Jones was not intended to change the 
ownership of property,  but simply to remove the pro-hierarchy bias from that consideration.  
Instead, the Court gave both parties’ views equal weight so as to create an unbiased review.
The four Justices in dissent, lead by Justice Powell, believed the majority went too far in 
requiring a court to engage in a document review to define the parties’ agreement.  On the 
contrary, the dissent concurred with the Watson court’s reasoning that the parties’ agreement to a 
form of hierarchical government was all the evidence that the court could or should review.27  By 
instead requiring a probing review into church documents, but limited to those documents 
evidencing secular intent to create a trust, the majority “ensures that in some cases the courts will 
25
  443 U.S. at 604 (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976)).
26 Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 614 (Powell, J. dissenting).
7impose a form of church government and a doctrinal resolution at odds with that reached by the 
church's own authority.”28
Though Watson and Jones employ different approaches, both seek the same result:  to 
enforce the will of the parties as expressed in the contract between them.  Thus, the Watson
deference approach allowed that “[i]ndividuals or groups may affiliate themselves for religious 
purposes with any other individuals or groups they choose – apparently on any terms – without 
interference form the courts.”29  The Jones neutral principles approach – “a restrictive rule of 
evidence,” as Justice Powell termed it30 – applied a different standard and looked at different 
evidence, but to the same purpose:  to enforce the parties’ contract.31 For that reason, Jones 
specifically allowed for a single statement of trust in the hierarchy’s documents to be 
determinative.  The rule after Jones appears to be that, so long as the terms of the contract 
between the parties can be discerned, it is to be enforced by the courts.
II. Pennsylvania Has Adopted Neutral Principles of Law as the Exclusive Approach for 
Resolving Church Property Disputes.
Even prior to Jones, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had suggested that it would apply 
neutral principles to resolve church property disputes.  In Western Pennsylvania Conference of 
United Methodist Church v. Everson Evangelical Church the court addressed a church property 
dispute within a hierarchical denomination, wherein two parishes sought to withdraw from the 
hierarchy with which they were affiliated.32  In both parishes, title to the property favored the 
parish.33  The parishes, however, admitted that they “subscribed to the doctrine and were subject 
28 Id. at 613 n.2 (Powell, dissenting).
29
  Adams, supra note 10, at 1299-1300.
30
  334 U.S. at 611 (Powell, dissenting)
31
  Adams, supra note 10, at 1317; see also id. at 1317 (““Significantly, the four dissenting Justices also appeared to
have accepted this same underlying rationale.”).
32
  312 A.2d 35, 36 (Pa. 1973).
33 Id. at 36-37.  Title at one parish was in the parish’s name and, at the other, was in the name of certain individuals 
as trustees for the parish.
8to the jurisdictional control of” the hierarchy and “that the Book of Discipline of the said United 
Methodist Church provides that the parent denomination governs all matters relating to the use of 
property held by its member churches.”34
The Everson court first acknowledged that Pennsylvania law required that any parish that 
separated itself from its hierarchy must forfeit the property it held.35 Nonetheless, the court said 
that it was applying “neutral principles of law” to resolve the case, under which approach it 
placed the property with the denomination according to the hierarchy’s Book of Discipline “a 
contractual agreement between the parent denomination and its members”.36 Because Everson
acknowledged both deference and neutral principles, it left unclear exactly what law 
Pennsylvania courts should apply.  The opinion, however, did clearly establish the elements of a 
neutral principles approach.  First, under neutral principles, courts should settle church property 
disputes according to the intent of the parties, as expressed in their denominational documents.  
Second, these denominational documents were to be construed as a contract.  Third, if that 
contract gave the hierarchy control over the use of the property, then that contract would be 
enforced.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court next dealt with a church property dispute in Presbytery 
of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church,37 its first decision relating to church 
property after Jones.  The case involved a parish that had been part of the United Presbyterian 
Church in the United States of America (a hierarchical body) and its predecessor since 1799.38
34 Id. at 37.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 37, 38 (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. The Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 
A. 2d 162 (Md. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 367, 90 S. Ct. 499 (1970)).
37
  489 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1985).
38 Id. at 1318 (Pa. 1985); Presbytery of Beaver-Butler v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 471 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1984).
9The parish had split into two competing groups, the larger of which sought to leave the hierarchy 
and retain the parish property.39
The evidence before the court did not lead to any obvious conclusion.  Title to the 
property was in the parish’s name.40  There was no explicit trust language in the hierarchy’s 
documents (in fact, the dispute arose just prior to the inclusion of such language).41  The parish’s 
charter, however, provided that its purpose is “to worship according to the faith, doctrine, creed, 
discipline and usages of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.”42  Also 
supporting the pro-hierarchy group’s claim to the property were several passages from the 
hierarchy’s Book of Order, which gave the hierarchy authority over sale and use of the property 
as well as a right to the property in case of parish dissolution.43  The trial court granted summary 
judgment awarding the property to the parish.44
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed this decision, first ruling that the 
property should remain with the hierarchy under the deference approach and then finding that the 
same result would occur were neutral principles applied.45  In its neutral principles analysis, the 
39
  471 A.2d at 1272.
40 Id. at 1272.
41 Id. at 1280 n.3
42 Id. at 1272.
43 [i]n the case of a formal dissolution or extinction of a particular [parish], its 
properties shall be held, used and applied to such uses as the [hierarchy] should 
direct …. The particular [parish] may not sell, mortgage, encumber, or lease real 
property without permission of the [hierarchy] …. The [hierarchy] … may 
determine that the … particular [parish] is unable or unwilling to manage wisely 
the affairs of its church and appoint an Administrative Commission to take 
charge of the particular [parish]….  [The hierarchy] has “exclusive authority 
over the uses to which the [parish] buildings and properties may be put” and to 
delegate this responsibility to the trustees of the adjunct nonprofit corporation 
subject to the “superior authority and direction of the [hierarchy].” … Finally, 
trustees, the name given the officers of the nonprofit corporation holding title to 
[parish] property “shall deal with such property only as they may be authorized 
or directed by the [hierarchy].”
Id. at 1281 (citations omitted).
44
  489 A.2d at 1319.
45 471 A.2d at 1274, 1279.
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commonwealth court relied on the noted provisions of the Book of Order, combined with the 
statement of purpose in the parish charter and the effect of a Pennsylvania statute under which 
“control of local congregations over property is subject to the regulations and requirements of the 
denomination of which it is a part,”46 as demonstrating that the parish had intended to bind its 
property to the hierarchy under neutral principles of law.47
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned these conclusions.  First, it determined that 
it would exclusively apply neutral principles of law, as it found had been acknowledged in 
Presbyterian Church and Sharpsburg and approved in Jones, to church property disputes.48  The 
court then determined that only the parish could be the settlor of any property interest because 
the parish “was not a creation or offshoot of the central denomination,” “all property was 
retained in the corporate name of the parish,” and “there was never any express trust language in 
the [hierarchy’s] constitution during the entire period [the parish] remained affiliated.”49
Because the parish was the settlor, it was the parish’s intent that was relevant.
Despite the apparent similarity to the evidence in Everson (a comparison not 
acknowledged in Beaver-Butler),  the court found that the Beaver-Butler parish had not shown 
any intent to place a property interest with the hierarchy.  This conclusion was based on two 
premises:  first, the parish had retained the property in its own name, and second, the Book of 
Order was intended “as a means of overseeing the spiritual development of member churches” 
and was therefore not evidence of an intent to place the property with the hierarchy.50  The court 
46
  10 P.S. § 81.
47
  471 A.2d 1279-81.
48
  489 A.2d at 1321.  The Commonwealth Court relied on Everson for the statement that deference applied.  471 
A.2d at 1275-76.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court however, found this reliance misplaced as, in its view, Everson 
required neutral principles analysis.  489 A.2d at 1322-23.
49
  489 A.2d at 1324-25.
50 Id. at 1325.
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also noted, in dicta, that the provisions in the Book of Order were “far from constituting the clear 
unequivocal evidence necessary to support a conclusion that a trust existed.”51
These findings are inherently problematic and confuse any application of neutral 
principles.  First, the court justified its ruling on the fact that the parish had kept title to the 
property in its own name.52  If, however, the name in which the property is titled were
conclusive, then there would never be an analysis of the charters and religious documents to see 
if those documents show the necessary intent to create a trust, as neutral principles contemplates.  
While the fact that the property is not titled to the hierarchy is a necessary before the court could 
consider if the parties showed the intent to create a property interest, it is not the end of the 
analysis under neutral principles. 53 Yet, perhaps with the intent of adopting Justice Brennan’s 
“formal title” approach from Sharpsburg, the Beaver-Butler decision treats this prerequisite as a 
conclusion.  
Second, the conclusion to ignore the Book of Order, because it was “spiritual” in nature 
and could not be evidence of the intent to create a trust, is equally problematic.54 The reported 
decision does not explain the reasons for the finding that the Book of Order is exclusively 
“spiritual,” but a review of the Beaver-Butler defendants’ filings for summary judgment is 
illuminating.  In their motion for summary judgment, the Beaver-Butler defendants had 
specifically argued that the “Book of Order provides that the governing bodies of UPCUSA 
possess only ecclesiastical power and ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” and in support of that 
51 Id. at 1325.
52 Id. at 1325.
53
  This is not to say that the fact that the property is titled to the parish is not evidence of the parish’s intent not to 
create a trust, which of course it is, as the clearest intent to create a trust would be a direct statement in the deed that 
a trust exists.
54
  489 A.2d at 1325.
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argument they quoted portions of the document.55  It is odd, however, that the court accepted the 
“spiritual” interpretation out of hand, with no discussion in the opinion, especially because the 
Book of Order language does not appear necessarily to lead to that interpretation and because, as 
religious documents, the language may have meanings not readily apparent to layperson.56
But even if the finding that the document is “spiritual” were correct, the very premise of 
neutral principles as stated in Jones is that the court considers religious documents for their civil 
impact.57  If the document reviewed was so “spiritual” in nature that the court could not interpret 
it without relying on “religious precepts,” then the court “must defer to the resolution of the 
doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”58  In Beaver-Butler, that would mean 
that if interpretation of the Book of Order was made impossible by its religious intent, then the 
55
  Mot. for Summ. J., filed in Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of 
America v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, Eq. No. 81-024 
Book 23 Page 241, filed Feb. 19, 1982, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).  The full quotations are as follows:
Since ecclesiastical discipline must be purely moral or spiritual in its object, and 
not attended with any civil effects, it can derive no force whatever but from its 
own justice, the approbation of an impartial public, and the countenance and 
blessing of the great Head of the Church Universal.
Id. at 5 (quoting Book of Order ¶ 31.08 (1980-81).
These judicatories ought not to possess any civil jurisdiction, or to 
impose any civil penalties.  Their power is wholly moral or spiritual, and that 
only ministerial and declarative.  They possess the right of requiring obedience 
to the laws of Christ and of excluding the disobedient and disorderly from the 
privileges of the Church.  To give efficiency, however to this necessary and 
Scriptural authority, they possess the powers requisite for obtaining evidence 
and inflicting order and government of the Church; they can require members of 
their own society to appear and give testimony in the cause; but the highest 
punishment to which their authority extends is to exclude the contumacious and 
impenitent from the congregation of believers.
Id. at 6 (quoting Book of Order ¶ 35.05 (1980-81)) (emphasis added).  “The functions of the Church as a Kingdom 
and government distinct form the civil commonwealth are to proclaim, to administer, and to enforce the law of 
Christ revealed in the Scriptures.”  Id. (quoting Book of Order ¶ 35.08 (1980-81) (emphasis added).
56 See generally Sirico, supra note 10, at 33 (arguing that civil events may have religious implications:  “a religious 
question is arguably involved – whether a church that withdraws from a general church ceases to exist.  From the 
general church’s viewpoint, apostasy might be the equivalent of nonexistence.”).
57 Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (the court must consider “religious documents” and “scrutinize the document[s] in purely 
secular terms”).
58 Id.. at 604 (citation omitted).
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court should have deferred to the hierarchy’s determination that the document was intended to 
create a trust.  
Without these two conclusions, the Beaver-Butler decision would only stand on the 
court’s final reason, given as dicta, that the provisions of the Book of Order were insufficient to 
show the intent to create a trust.59  The asserted insufficiency of the evidence might be an 
appropriate ground for the holding (though one that was belied by the similarity to Everson), but 
it was not the one on which the court relied.
III. In re: St. James the Less Claims Continuity with Beaver-Butler, but Demonstrates 
Difference.
After Beaver-Butler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not again address church 
property disputes until In re: St. James the Less, a dispute between a parish and the hierarchy of 
which it was a member, the Episcopal Church.60  In 1999, as the result of long-standing doctrinal 
differences between the parish and the hierarchy, the parish attempted to disaffiliate while 
retaining its property, through the mechanism of merging into a previously-established 
corporation that had no relationship to the hierarchy.61
The evidence in St. James bore a striking similarity to that in Beaver-Butler.  Title to the 
property was in the parish’s name,62 but from 1967 until the attempted merger, the parish’s 
charter had provided that the purpose of the corporation was “the support of the public worship 
of Almighty God according to the faith and discipline of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the 
59
  489 A.2d at 1325.
60 In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E. D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *1 - *2 (Pa. 
Dec. 29, 2005).  The opinion is officially reported at 888 A.2d 795, but as of the time of this printing, official page 
numbers had not been assigned.
61 In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *10 (Pa. Dec. 29, 
2005).
62
  833 A.2d at 322.
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United States of America and the Diocese of Pennsylvania.”63, 64 Also like in Beaver-Butler (and 
Everson, for that matter), in St. James the hierarchy’s documents gave the hierarchy authority 
over the disposition and use of the property.65
The charter and the hierarchical documents in St. James each had a significant difference 
from Beaver-Butler, however, most particularly in the explicit statement of trust in the 
hierarchy’s documents via the 1979 Dennis Canon.66  In addition, the parish charter “excludes 
from membership any ‘person who shall disclaim or refuse conformity with and obedience to the 
constitution, canons, doctrines, discipline or worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church or of the 
Diocese ....’” and prohibited the parish from amending the charter without diocesan approval.67
The trial court determined that 10 P.S. § 81 (the same statute on which the 
Commonwealth Court had relied in Beaver-Butler)68 required the parish’s charter to incorporate 
all hierarchical rules regarding property and, pursuant to those rules, that the hierarchy was the 
holder and trustee of the property.69
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and ruled that the 
Dennis Canon alone demonstrates the existence of the trust.70  As part of this decision, the 
appellate court focused on a factor that distinguished St. James from Beaver-Butler: that St. 
63 Id. at 323 (citation omitted).  In the Episcopal Church hierarchy, dioceses are intermediary jurisdictions, superior 
to parishes, but beneath the church as a whole.
64
  The charter also provided that the parish “‘accedes to, recognizes and adopts the constitution, canons doctrines, 
discipline and worship’” of the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Diocese.  Id.  Presumably because of the 
similarity of this provision to the purpose statement, the court did not deem it necessary to individually address this 
provision.
65 Id. at 325 n.5.
66
  The Dennis Canon, which the Episcopal church adopted in response to the invitation in Jones v. Wolf, states that 
“[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for 
this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located.” Id. at 322 n.2 
(citation omitted).   The Diocese had also enacted explicit trust language, in 1941, stating that parish property is held 
“for the work of the Diocese.”  In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. 
LEXIS 3116, at *38 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2005).
67
  833 A.2d at 323 (citations omitted; ellipses in original).
68
  471 A.2d 1279-81.
69
  833 A.2d at 321-22.
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James had remained part of the hierarchy after the Dennis Canon was adopted, whereas the 
parish in Beaver-Butler had not.71  The court, however, also made clear that St. James would not 
have avoided the trust interest had it left the hierarchy prior to the Dennis Canon.  On the 
contrary, the court found that there were preexisting evidences of a trust72 – even though, with 
regard to several of these other proofs, “[s]imilar language quoted from the Book of Order in 
Presbytery of Beaver-Butler was held to refer only to matters of spiritual development and not to 
evidence intent to create a trust”.73
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts’ determination that there 
was a trust, but on different grounds.74  Like the commonwealth court, the supreme court found 
that the Dennis Canon created a trust.75  The larger part of the decision, however, asked whether 
the parish had intended to establish a trust interest in its property such that the interest shown by 
Dennis Canon was not forced upon it.  The supreme court found that the parish had such intent:
St. James’ Charter declares that St. James’ purpose is to serve as a 
place to worship God “according to the faith and discipline of the 
[National Episcopal Church].”  More importantly, the Charter 
ensures that St. James will always be used for this purpose as it (1) 
states that any person who disclaims the authority of the National 
Episcopal Church or the Diocese can no longer be a member of St. 
James; and (2) requires St. James to obtain the Diocese's consent 
for amendments to its Charter.  Accordingly, St. James effectively 
agreed in these provisions to always accede to the authority of the 
National Episcopal Church and the Diocese and to forever serve as 
a place of worship for those who adhere to that same authority.76
70 Id .at 324.
71 Id. at 324-25.
72 Id. at 325.
73 Id. at 323.
74
  The Supreme Court did not affirm the lower court’s finding that the hierarchy was the title holder and trustee, 
however, instead finding that the title holder and trustee was the parish. In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 
E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *41-*42 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2005).
75 Id. *40.
76 Id. at *36-37 (citations and footnote omitted; insertion in original).
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The court also found relevant, though not necessary to the decision, that St. James amended its 
charter (and accepted the rules then in effect) after the Diocese had added its 1941 canon 
requiring the parish to “to take and hold its property ‘for the work of the [Diocese],’” and that the 
hierarchy’s rules required the parish “not to alienate or encumber its property without the 
Diocese's consent,” and that “if [the parish] ever dissolves, its property will be placed in trust for 
the Diocese.”77
It is particularly of note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that these provisions 
supported the intent to create a trust while admitting that they were “similar” to the provisions 
that Beaver-Butler said did not.78  Indeed, this very similarity was evoked by the St. James 
defendants as part of their argument against finding a trust.79  The court, however, ruled that “the 
provisions in the instant case are distinguishable from those in Beaver-Butler primarily because 
they require St. James to always accede to the authority of the” hierarchy and because the 
Beaver-Butler provisions did not prohibit disaffiliation.80
Writing in dissent, Justice Newman pointed out several perceived problems in the 
majority opinion.  First, she found that several points of Pennsylvania trust law made it difficult 
for the hierarchy to show the existence of a trust in St. James, specifically because the law placed 
a high burden of proof on the hierarchy to show a trust and made several technical requirements 
that were not fulfilled under the facts of St. James.81  Second, Justice Newman assailed the 
majority’s reliance on documents that “fail even to mention the res of the supposed trust” and 
therefore cannot show “St. James intended by including the language in its Charter to create a 
77 Id. at *39.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *39 n.29.
80 Id.
81 Id. at *46-*53 (Newman, J., concurring).
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trust.”82  Finally, Justice Newman attacked the remaining points the majority claims as additional 
evidence of the intent to create a trust, on the basis that materially identical language was held 
insufficient in Beaver-Butler.83
Justice Newman’s points are not invalid, but equally they do not undermine the St. James 
decision.  Instead, they highlight the several ways in which In re: St. James the Less revised the 
state of the law after Beaver-Butler, without expressly overturning with the prior opinion.
IV. The Differing Conclusion in St. James than that in Beaver-Butler Signifies Two 
Changes in Pennsylvania Law Regarding Church Property Disputes.
In distinguishing itself from Beaver-Butler solely on the basis of the unbreakable bond 
between the parish and the hierarchy, while choosing not to address the two reasons the Beaver-
Butler court gave in support of its decision (i.e., that the deeds did not include explicit trust 
language and that the document containing the relevant language was “spiritual”), despite the 
similarities that implicate these other reasons, the St. James court has indicated a move away 
from the principles in the earlier decision and placed itself on more firm constitutional ground.
The intended larger effect of St. James can be seen, in part, by its going beyond the issues 
absolutely necessary to its result. Having established that the parish charter prohibited anyone 
who disclaimed the hierarchy’s authority from having any membership in the parish, the court 
could have simply ruled that it was “unscrambling the omelet” created by the parish’s attempted 
departure:  if anyone who disclaimed authority was no longer a member empowered to take acts 
for the parish and if attempting to leave the hierarchy was an act that disclaimed authority, then it 
would be impossible for the parish to effect any action that would cause the parish property to 
82 Id. at *53-*54 (Newman, J., concurring).
83 Id. at *47-*51 (Newman, J., concurring).
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leave the hierarchy.84  Instead of making this its ultimate conclusion, however, the court treated 
this holding as a step toward justifying the property interest.  The implication is that the court felt 
it had to clarify the principles it addressed in that additional discussion (i.e. regarding neutral 
principles) and was not merely confirming established ideas.
For that matter, treating St .James as merely confirming Beaver-Butler would be odd in 
that there was no need to reconfirm Beaver-Butler at all.  The decision remained good law at the 
time of St. James and the court’s decision in St. James did not change the lower courts’ finding 
of a trust.  Had the court merely wished to modify an aspect of the lower courts’ opinions (e.g., 
by changing the trustee from the parish to the hierarchy) it could have limited its opinion to that 
point.  There is no justification for the length and breadth of opinion that was produced unless it 
is understood as clarifying mistakes made by Beaver-Butler.
Justice Newman’s dissent also helps illustrate that St. James did not seek to simply 
confirm the Beaver-Butler approach.  Her points regarding general trust law and unaddressed 
similarities between Beaver-Butler and St. James85 are apt, but they do not undermine the 
ultimate conclusion in St. James if the unnecessary assumption that St. James merely sought to 
reconfirm Beaver-Butler is removed.  When viewed from the perspective that the St. James court 
was not trying to support Beaver-Butler, t he issues upon which Justice Newman focuses merely 
serve to highlight a change in the law.
84
  For that matter, the trial court and appellate courts had found that the parish’s attempted merger was void for 
failure to obtain both court and hierarchy approval.  Id. at *13, *19 n.20.  Court approval, in particular, was required 
under a provision of the Pennsylvania Corporate Code (15 Pa. C.S. §  5547) that prohibited any change in corporate 
purpose without such.  Thus, simply continuing to apply the secular code would have allowed the court an “out” that 
did not require any analysis of an implied trust under neutral principles.  In fact the lower court’s decisions on this 
point had not been presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review, id.. at *13, and the court could simply 
have ruled that an opinion on whether there was a trust was unnecessary because the attempted merger was undone 
in any event.
85 Id. at *46-*54 (Newman, J., concurring).
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If one reviews the St. James decision not just for its holding, but for what it actually 
relied on, says, and does not say, it becomes clear that the St. James court did far more than 
simply resolve the case before it.  Instead it rectified two errors in Pennsylvania law regarding 
church property disputes.  
A. St. James Clarifies that a Court Must Review All Available Evidence and 
that Exclusion of the “Spiritual” Is Prohibited.
By acknowledging but then ignoring the Beaver-Butler court’s refusal to review a 
“spiritual” document for its civil effect and by refocusing the inquiry on the standards from 
Jones (which undermine the Beaver-Butler approach), the St. James court has shown the Beaver-
Butler view  of neutral principles is no longer valid law.
That St. James has dismissed Beaver-Butler’s review of documents to determine if they 
are “spiritual” is established at several points in the decision.  In  no small part, that change is 
shown in St. James’s choice not to substantively address Beaver-Butler’s reliance on the 
“spiritual” finding, despite acknowledging that this issue was present in the prior decision.86  It is 
no answer to say that the question did not come up in St. James:  on the contrary, the parish 
raised the issue87 and the court specifically found that provisions “similar” to those ignored as 
coming from a “spiritual” source in Beaver-Butler were relevant to the case before it.88  If the 
question of “spirituality” continued to matter, one would expect that the St. James court would 
have stated at least that the hierarchy’s documents were not “spiritual” under the facts before it; 
instead, it did not even address that question.89 For that matter, Justice Newman also ignored the 
86 Compare id. at *31 n.26 (restating that Beaver-Butler found not intent to create a trust from the Book of Order
because that document focused on “spiritual development”) with id. at *39 n.29 (distinguishing Beaver-Butler 
without examining whether the hierarchy’s documents focused on spiritual development). 
87 Id. at *39 n.29.
88
  A conclusion which the appellate court reached and highlight for the supreme court’s consideration.  833 A.2d at
323.
89 In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *38 (Pa. Dec. 29, 
2005).
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“spiritual” issue, focusing instead on the prior court’s finding that the similar evidence was 
insufficient proof.90  Thus, neither majority nor minority saw fit to address this key element of 
the prior court’s decision, a clear indication that neither believed that theory had continued 
viability.
The movement away from Beaver-Butler can also be seen in the St. James court’s return 
to Jones rather than Beaver-Butler for its statement of the relevant standards. 91  To that end, the 
St. James court restated the principle in Jones as follows:  “the Court directed civil courts to 
scrutinize documents evincing the parties’ intentions, such as a church charter or constitution, ‘in 
purely secular terms, and not rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document 
indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust’”92 and required the courts to review the 
“‘terms of a governing statute, the property deed, and any other document that expresses the 
parties’ intentions regarding the ownership of the property.’”93  In contrast, Beaver-Butler 
contains only one quotation from Jones and that sole reference contains none of this language, 
instead focusing on the idea that neutral principles will “free civil courts completely from 
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”94 When it refused to 
review the hierarchy’s documents as too “spiritual,” Beaver-Butler may have been focusing on 
this quotation and thereby violated key elements of Jones. By returning to Jones, St. James re-
established the proper standards for review.
90 Id. at *42-*56.
91
  In regard to which, it is notable that Jones specifically included the “Book of Church Order” in its discussion of 
documents that were to be considered under neutral principles.
92 In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *26 n.24 (Pa. 
Dec. 29, 2005) (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 604).
93 Id. at *25 (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 603).
94
  507 Pa. at 263.
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B. After St. James, Civil Courts Are to View the Evidence in Church Property 
Disputes as a Contract and Interpret It Without Bias in Favor of Either 
Party.
A second principle to draw from St. James is that evidence should be read without bias to 
accurately determine the parties’ intent.  That was the approach in Everson, where the court 
found a trust under neutral principles.  There, the evidence was that the parish’s charter aligned 
the parish with the hierarchy and that the hierarchy’s rules gave the hierarchy authority over the 
disposition and use of the property.95 In Beaver-Butler the evidence was nearly identical, but the 
result was different, creating a clear conflict.96  By evaluating the evidence as it did in St. James, 
the court resolved the conflict between Everson and Beaver-Butler in favor of the Everson 
court’s balanced reading of the evidence.
In St. James the evidence was very similar to that in Everson and Beaver-Butler:  the 
parish had adopted a statement of purpose that aligned it with the hierarchy and the hierarchy had 
adopted rules that gave it authority over the disposition and use of the property.  To be fair, there 
were also differences between the evidence in St. James and that in the two earlier cases, but 
after recognizing these differences the supreme court maintained that it could rely on the
“similar” evidence as well in support of its opinion.97  The commonwealth court also noted that 
the evidence it relied upon was similar to that found insufficient in Beaver-Butler. 98   Thus, both 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Commonwealth Court found that evidence previously 
dismissed in a church property dispute was now relevant and probative.
95
  471 A.2d at 1280.
96
  The Beaver-Butler court does point out that the evidence of the hierarchy’s control over property issues in 
Everson was uncontested, 489 A.2d at 1322-23, but the differing conclusion in Beaver-Butler was the result of the 
weighting of this evidence and not a dispute over its existence. 
97 In re: Church of St. James the Less, No. 47 E.D. Appeal Docket 2004, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 3116, at *36-*37 (Pa. 
Dec. 29, 2005).
98
  833 A.2d at 323, 325 n.5.
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The clear similarity of the evidence in all three cases prohibits resolving a church 
property dispute according to either of the earlier cases without considering the effect of St. 
James.  Instead, the only conclusion to draw from the double reverse in the court’s reading of 
this evidence is that the Beaver-Butler reading is not correct.  It is not credible to believe that 
Beaver-Butler remains viable under any factual distinction between the three cases for two 
reasons.  First, the facts in the three cases are too similar and the results are too divergent to 
accept the attempt to harmonize them by pointing to the minor differences.  Instead, the only 
reasonable way to account for the changing outcome is by recognizing the changed standard.
Second, St. James had reason to reform the Beaver-Butler view:  the earlier decision was 
inconsistent with Jones in that it ignored evidence of the parties’ intentions.  It did this not only 
explicitly, when it excluded one’s party’s statement of intention by refusing to assess the 
hierarchy’s documents because they were “spiritual,” but also implicitly when it undervalued the 
hierarchy’s view (that is, it created a pro-parish bias), by finding that evidence, sufficient in 
Everson, was now insufficient to show property interest.  
Replacing the Watson court’s pro-hierarchy bias with a pro-parish bias was not the 
intended effect of Jones. Rather, by giving each party equal power, Jones signaled a move to an 
unbiased review.  It was for that reason that the Court could state that the new approach would 
not alter the outcome of a case where the parties did not intend it to do so.  Instead, each party 
would be empowered to announce the parties’ intent and, once done, that announcement became 
binding. Because Beaver-Butler violated this principle by undervaluing one party’s intent, St. 
James returned to Jones.
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V. Conclusion.
As this article argues, In re: St. James the Less restores Pennsylvania law to the path it 
had attained in the Everson decision, but from which it detoured with Beaver-Butler.  Of course, 
the court has done so without explicitly overturning Beaver-Butler, but neither did Beaver-Butler 
explicitly overturn Everson; it simply rendered the prior decision superfluous by inserting the 
“spiritual” question into the approach.  In re-evaluating Beaver-Butler, the St. James court has 
restored the neutral principles approach to the focus suggested in Jones and applied in Everson,
the search for the parties’ actual intent.
In both Watson and Jones the Supreme Court sought to define the appropriate scope of 
review for a civil court examining a church property dispute – to determine how far into the 
temple Caesar could appropriately go.  Both Courts found that it was appropriate for a court to 
enforce that to which the parties had agreed.  Where the courts disagreed was only in 
determining what evidence to consider in order to establish that agreement: Watson looked for 
evidence that the parish agreed to bind itself to the hierarchy, while Jones looked for evidence 
that the parish and hierarchy had agreed to hierarchical property control. The Watson approach 
created a de facto pro-hierarchy bias in its result (because a dispute always includes a hierarchy 
that believes it is right), but under both cases, the idea of civil court intervention in a church 
property dispute was to evaluate the appropriate evidence and generate a result consistent with 
the parties’ intention.
Beaver-Butler moved away from this concept, instead focusing on only those statements 
of intent that were available in strictly secular sources and undervaluing other sources even if 
they were to be reviewed, perhaps in an unstated reliance on the “formal title” approach to 
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neutral principles that Justice Brennan suggested in his Sharpsburg concurrence.99  It did this 
despite the guidance in Jones to the contrary and despite its more broad view of the evidence in 
Everson. Moreover, it did this even though formal title is not the majority position100 and is of 
uncertain constitutionality – Justice Brennan would have allowed it, but the Jones court approved 
a far less restrictive approach only by the slightest of majorities.
By re-evaluating Beaver-Butler, St. James has turned away from the formal title approach 
and returned Pennsylvania law to the view Jones espoused.  Thus, future Pennsylvania courts 
reviewing church property disputes are to consider all evidence and not to avoid secular review 
of the “spiritual.”  Moreover, the courts must determine the parties’ intent without weighting the 
evidence toward any particular result.  Thus, In re: St. James the Less returns Pennsylvania law 
to an accepted and workable approach to resolution of church property disputes. 
The counter argument, that St. James and Beaver-Butler present a consistent approach,
falls in light of Everson.  It is impossible to square Everson and Beaver-Butler after St. James:  
once the “spiritual” argument is removed from Beaver-Butler, the fac ts in that case mirror those 
in Everson such that either Beaver-Butler must overturn Everson or Beaver-Butler itself must be 
overturned as inconsistent with the prior opinion.  At the same time, the St. James court’s 
99
  The Beaver-Butler court may also have relied on certain language in Justice Powell’s Jones dissent, see Sirico, 
supra note 10, at 47 (“According to Justice Powell, the [neutral principles] rule acts as a restrictive rule of evidence 
in that it limits courts to examining language written in secular legal property terms and forbids consideration of 
other language that might speak to the allocation of authority within the church polity.”) (citing 443 U.S. at 612-14 
(Powell, J., dissenting)), or a misreading of the language in Jones  that “a State may adopt any one of various 
approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, 
whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith,’” 443 U.S. at 602 (second emphasis added), putting 
too much emphasis on the second clause of this statement.  In any event, it is clear from the Beaver-Butler court’s 
exclusion of the “spiritual” evidence and focus on the title deeds, that it did not apply neutral principles as broadly as 
Jones stated.
100 See, e.g., Bishop & Diocese of Colorado v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986) (rejecting “formal title” label 
for neutral principles analysis). See also generally, e.g., Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen v. Episcopal Church in the 
Diocese, 620 A.2d 1280, 1293 (Conn. 1993) (considering hierarchy’s documents under neutral principles);
Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988); Daniel v. Wray, 580 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2003) (same) Trustees of the Diocese v. Trinity Episcopal Church, 684 N.Y.S.2d 76, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) 
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reliance on evidence equal to that accepted in Everson cannot be squared with Beaver-Butler’s 
rank dismissal of that same evidence if the intermediate decision remains good law.  Instead, the 
only conclusion is that there has been a change in the relevant law and that under the St. James 
view of the neutral principles standard, all available evidence is to be given unbiased review to 
determine the parties’ intent and that intent is to be enforced.
Looked at more broadly, Pennsylvania’s experience is instructive for other jurisdictions 
that may consider institution of the formal title approach.  Under Everson, Pennsylvania’s 
approach was consistent with that later suggested in Jones – a broad review of all available 
evidence to determine both parties’ intent.  The switch in Beaver-Butler, however, all but 
removed the hierarchy’s intent from the analysis and reached a conclusion that directly 
contradicted the hierarchy’s view.  Thus, the Beaver-Butler application created the very situation 
about which Justice Powell warned:  it imposed a form of governance at odds with that the 
parties actual chose.  That also would have occurred in St. James had the court continued in the 
narrow view and is likely to occur in any other case using strict title as well:  only the rarest 
dispute will include a parish that has deliberately included in its own documents the views of a 
hierarchy with which it disagrees.  But the conclusion to draw from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s move away from this approach is that ignoring one party’s intent is bad law and worse 
policy.  Instead, the better view is to select an approach that gives voice to each party’s intent.
With In re St. James the Less, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has returned to that approach.
This broad approach is more consistent with that presently employed in most jurisdictions 
and is the one squarely approved in Jones as constitutional.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would chose to readopt it as it has with St. James.
(same); Parish of the Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese, 688 N.E.2d 923 (Mass. 1997) (same); Episcopal 
Diocese v. DeVine, 797 N.E.2d 916, 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (same).
